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NOTES




As an allegedly integral part of the "rule of law," stare decisis re-
ceives copious academic attention. The present academic discourse
focuses on the Court's lack of a coherent philosophy on when it will
overrule past precedent.' Critics contend stare decisis has become "a
doctrine of convenience, to both conservatives and liberals . . .
[whose] friends . . . are determined by the needs of the moment."2
Both academics and practitioners seem quite concerned about the fu-
ture of stare decisis on the Supreme Court. I share their concern.
However, I am not concerned with defining precise or appropriate
boundaries for stare decisis. Rather, I am concerned stare decisis will
persevere despite its shortcomings when leaving it behind is clearly
the better policy choice. As such, this Note argues stare decisis in con-
stitutional interpretation should be a purely pragmatic tool. My argu-
ment echoes that of William S. Consovoy.3 However, Mr. Consovoy
crafts his call to arms after determining stare decisis standards are un-
workable and demonstrating the damage unprincipled stare decisis
does to the Court. My work here explains why abrogating constitu-
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2006. The author would
like to thank Erin Gallagher for her continued support and suggestions.
1 See, e.g., Robert H. Bork et al., Federalist Society Roundtable Discussion, 1994 PUB.
INT. L. REv. 125, 132 (noting the use of precedent is motivated by political concerns);
William S. Consovoy, The Rehnquist Court and the End of Constitutional Stare Decisis:
Casey, Dickerson, and the Consequences of Pragmatic Adjudication, 2002 UTAH L. REv. 53,
70 ("[W]hen motivated, the Supreme Court will overrule a prior decision of the
Court, regardless of age, subject matter, or any other pragmatic consideration.").
2 Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 401, 402 (1988).
3 Consovoy, supra note 1, at 104-06.
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tional stare decisis except as a tool for judicial economy is the best
policy choice. The jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court has not
pushed us to a position where eliminating constitutional stare decisis
is the only option; it has always been the best option. When I use the
phrase "principled pragmatic stare decisis" in this Note, I mean stare
decisis should be abrogated except when used as a tool for judicial
economy. In this way, its use is consistent (principled) and still pre-
vents judges from having to reinvent the wheel with every new consti-
tutional case (pragmatic).
Before I continue, it is important to qualify the type of stare deci-
sis this Note considers. This Note deals with horizontal stare decisis-
the respect one court gives to its own prior precedent. Throughout
the Note I will discuss the Supreme Court, but my thesis applies to
horizontal stare decisis at any level. Under principled pragmatic stare
decisis, lower courts are still bound by the precedent of the courts
above them. Specifically, this Note addresses constitutional stare deci-
sis. Statutory stare decisis presents separate concerns and generates its
own academic literature.4 After these qualifications my thesis remains
the same: horizontal, constitutional stare decisis should be principled
and pragmatic. Stare decisis should be only a tool of judicial
economy.
Part I of this Note details a brief history of stare decisis, Part II
more fully sketches out what my theory entails and contains two small
sample passages of a principled pragmatic opinion, and Part III de-
fends my theory as the best policy.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF STARE DECISIS
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, English courts
began to develop "a qualified obligation to abide by past decisions."5
At the beginning of the eighteenth century William Blackstone noted
"it is an established rule to abide by former precedents, where the
same points come again in litigation."6 Blackstone outlined many of
the same policy concerns modern writers use to justify stare decisis.
He thought litigants would need to rely on precedent, having a system
of precedent would increase the credibility of the court, and prece-
4 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 CEO. L.J.
1361 (1988); Lawrence C. Marshall, Contempt of Congress: A Reply to the Critics of an
Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2467 (1990); Lawrence C. Mar-
shall, "Let Congress Do It": The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH.
L. REv. 177 (1989).
5 Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the
Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REv. 647, 661 (1999).
6 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69.
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dent would increase stability because the law would not change rap-
idly. 7 Importantly, however, Blackstone's concept of the law was quite
different from the modern realist understanding. In the positivist tra-
dition of his time, Blackstone believed judges discovered law, writing
"it sometimes may happen that the judge may mistake the law."8
At the end of the eighteenth century, the English courts and
commentators firmly established the doctrine of stare decisis.9 Courts
would follow prior precedent when promulgated by a superior court,
the House of Lords would follow its own prior decisions, and the
Court of Appeals would usually follow the past decisions of both the
specific court the case was in front of and other coordinate courts of
the same level. ' 0 There were three limits on the doctrine: (1) the rule
would not be followed if it were "plainly unreasonable" or (2) courts
of equal authority developed conflicting decisions, and (3) the bind-
ing force of the decision was the actual "principle or principles neces-
sary for the decision," not the words or reasoning used to reach the
decision.1'
The American Founders expressed similar attitudes towards stare
decisis. They were all certain it was necessary to some degree but dif-
fered strongly on what it entailed and when it should be abandoned. 12
Alexander Hamilton advocated "strict rules and precedents" to pre-
vent "arbitrary discretion in the courts."'13 However, it is difficult to
extract from Hamilton's work whether he believed in strong horizon-
tal stare decisis rather than just strong vertical stare decisis.14
Madison, on the other hand, was less strict, arguing the principle had
limits and when past precedent contained clear error about the law, it
should be overruled. 15 Early legal commentators evinced a similar
philosophy that stare decisis was important for legitimacy and past
precedent should be rarely overruled. 16
The first significant development in the doctrine of constitutional
stare decisis came during the post-Civil War cases dealing with the fed-
7 Id.
8 Id. at *71.
9 Robert A. Sprecher, The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to
Which It Should Be Applied, 31 A.B.A. J. 501, 502 (1945).
10 Id.
11 Id. at 503.
12 Consovoy, supra note 1, at 67.
13 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 407 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey &
James McClellan eds., 2001).
14 Consovoy, supra note 1, at 68.
15 Id. Consovoy notes there may never have "been a theory of stare decisis that
did not include a 'clear error' exception." Id. at 69 n.74.
16 Id. at 69.
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eral government's power to issue legal tender. In the first case,
Hepburn v. Griswold, the Court held a statute authorizing the federal
government to issue note money was unconstitutional because it ex-
ceeded Congress's Article I power.17 Soon after the decision, the Pres-
ident appointed two new members to the Court, Justice Story and
Justice Bradley. 18 On May 1, 1871, the Court, deciding a number of
cases known as the Legal Tender Cases, overruled Hepburn.19 The ma-
jority took the then controversial position that constitutional decisions
received less precedential value than any other cases.20 Surprisingly,
while modem courts require a "special justification" for overruling
prior cases, the Legal Tender Cases Court simply reasoned the original
court was wrong, and that was sufficient.21
The most popular example of the abrogation of constitutional
stare decisis is probably Brown v. Board of Education,22 which overruled
Plessy v. Ferguson's23 "separate but equal" doctrine. While lauding the
historical effect and sociological benefits of Brown is easy, explaining
why the Court chose to overrule Plessy is a bit more difficult. Some
argue the facts before the Court changed, while others claim the
Brown Court, much like the Court in the Legal Tender Cases, simply
recognized the earlier court was wrong. 24
The Rehnquist Court is quite radical when it comes to overturn-
ing past constitutional precedent. In fact, the Rehnquist Court over-
turned more precedent during the 1991 term than any court before
it.25 The Rehnquist Court's stare decisis jurisprudence is inconsistent
across cases, Justices, and even individual Justices have been inconsis-
tent.26 The Court has set forth some traditional factors for overturn-
ing prior precedent: workability, reliance, intervening developments
in the law, and changed or perceived changes in fact, in addition to
17 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 617-18, 626 (1869), overruled in part by The Legal Tender
Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871).
18 Lee, supra note 5, at 719-20.
19 The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 528 (1871).
20 Id. at 554.
21 Consovoy, supra note 1, at 72.
22 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
23 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
24 See Consovoy, supra note 1, at 74 n.113 (citing differing opinions in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and Neil M. Richards, Clio and the Court: A
Reassessment of the Supreme Court's Use of Histoy, 13J.L. & POL. 809, 814 (1997)).
25 Bork et al., supra note 1, at 132.
26 Consovoy, supra note 1, at 76 ("Some Justices appear to give one factor more
emphasis than the others. This provides for an inconsistency in stare decisisjurispru-
dence. Perhaps more troubling is when one Justice places considerable emphasis on
one factor, only to ignore that factor in a subsequent similar case.").
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some other nontraditional factors: margin of victory, age of the prior
decision, and merits of the prior decision.27
Justice Souter's jurisprudence regarding stare decisis has received
detailed academic attention and is described as "pragmatic."28 Based
on Justice Souter's decisions in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,
29
Payne v. Tennessee,30 and Lee v. Weisman,31 David Koehler concludes,
"depending upon whether a particular decision and course of action
was desirable or undesirable, Souter either applied or distinguished
stare decisis to justify the desired result."32 In Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,33 Justice Souter went so far as to read the part of the decision
regarding stare decisis from the bench. Casey dealt with a constitu-
tional challenge to Roe v. Wade based on a Pennsylvania statute limit-
ing the availability of, and setting certain requirements on, abortions
in that state.3 4 In the words of a dissenting Chief Justice Rehnquist,
"[i] nstead of claiming that Roe was correct as a matter of original con-
stitutional interpretation, the opinion .. . contains an elaborate dis-
cussion of stare decisis."35 Based on that "elaborate discussion," Casey
creates a three-prong test deciding whether prior constitutional prece-
dent should be overruled: whether the prior precedent created reli-
ance and overruling would create inequity and undue hardship,
whether the rule has proven unworkable, and whether the rule has
become, by virtue of legal development, insignificant or an anachro-
nism.36 While Casey maintained the essential holding of Roe (the con-
stitutional right to abortion), the fact it upheld other statutory
provisions requiring informed consent, parental consent, and a
twenty-four hour waiting period indicates Casey is not an endorsement
of the broadest reading possible of Roe.37 Thus, it appearsJustice Sou-
ter's stare decisis concerns allow him to take the "good" parts of a
holding and cast the rest aside depending on the consequences of a
particular decision.
27 Id. at 76-80.
28 See David K. Koehler, Comment, Justice Souter's "Keep-What-You-Want-and-Throw-
Away-the-Rest" Interpretation of Stare Decisis, 42 Burr. L. REv. 859, 861 (1994).
29 501 U.S. 529 (1991).
30 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
31 505 U.S. 557 (1992).
32 Koehler, supra note 28, at 875.
33 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
34 Id. at 844.
35 Id. at 953-54 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
36 Id. at 854-55.
37 Id. at 880-87, 899.
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II. PRINCIPLED PRAGMATIc STARE DEcIsIS
I take special note of Justice Souter's alleged stare decisis juris-
prudence because though it is labeled pragmatic, it is precisely the
type of stare decisis that is the problem. Justice Souter's stare decisis
jurisprudence is described as "The Law of Consequences." 38 "Souter
is not concerned about whether a precedent is absolutely right or
wrong, but whether it still works."39 I do not dispute whether the
word pragmatic is an appropriate word to describe this approach.
Rather, I argue we should adopt a different understanding of "prag-
matic" as it relates to stare decisis-a principled understanding of
pragmatism. Simply put, stare decisis should just be a judicial short-
cut. By maintaining prior precedent a judge simply says in short
hand: "I agree with the previous case, its reasoning, and its interpreta-
tion of the Constitution, so I feel no need to write anything more on
this particular issue." In this way stare decisis is pragmatic; its only
function is judicial economy and it is not a sacred legal doctrine, yet it
is also principled; it cannot be used, as in Casey, to support an argua-
bly incorrect interpretation of the Constitution because the judge
agrees with the result or believes the prior decision is just too impor-
tant to overturn.
Before I delve too much deeper into my own theory, it is impor-
tant to dispense with an argument raised recently by the Eighth Cir-
cuit in Anastasoff v. United States.40 In Anastasoff Judge Richard
Arnold argued stare decisis was a constitutional requirement under
Article III of the Constitution. 41 The issue in Anastasoffwas the consti-
tutionality of the Eighth Circuit decision to issue unpublished opin-
ions that cannot be cited as precedent.42 Judge Arnold argued "stare
decisis was such an established and integral feature of the common
law that it was implicit in the founding generation's understanding of
what it meant to exercise judicial power."43 As such, when the Consti-
tution vested the judicial power 44 the Founders expected a certain de-
gree of respect for prior precedent. Thus, stare decisis is a
38 Koehler, supra note 28, at 883.
39 Id. at 885.
40 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en
banc).
41 Id. at 900-05.
42 Id. at 905.
43 Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitutional Requirement, 104 W. VA. L. REV.
43, 45 (2001).
44 U.S. CONST. art III, §1, cl. 1.
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constitutional requirement; prior precedent can only be overturned
when the reasons for doing so are "convincingly clear."45
Preliminarily, I remark Anastasoff does not have any current legal
force. After it was decided an en banc panel of the Eighth Circuit
vacated the decision because the actions of the parties rendered it
moot.4 6 Judge Arnold wrote the en banc opinion and noted the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of nonprecedential opinions, and thus
stare decisis, is still open in the Eighth Circuit. 47
It is also worth noting that no other federal court agrees with
Judge Arnold's opinion and makes stare decisis a constitutional re-
quirement. Moreover, the Supreme Court's opinions and overturn-
ing of precedent certainly give no indication the Court believes it is a
constitutional requirement either. However, Judge Arnold could ar-
gue the Supreme Court tacitly endorses his theory because it justifies
its departures from past precedent, thus implicitly looking for a "con-
vincingly clear reason" to depart from past precedent. It is important
to address this argument because if stare decisis is in any way a consti-
tutional requirement, principled pragmatic stare decisis cannot stand
because it does not require a convincingly clear reason to overturn
past precedent other than the judge's belief the past precedent is
wrong.
Thomas Healy takes issue with Judge Arnold's reading of history,
concluding "as this history makes clear, for most of its life the com-
mon law operated without a doctrine of stare decisis."48 Turning to
the colonial understanding of stare decisis, Healy notes "[t]he defin-
ing characteristic of law in colonial America was its mutability ....
[F]rom their earliest years [the colonists] demonstrated a marked
preference for adaptability over certainty, for latitude over re-
straint."49 Colonial judges showed a willingness to innovate because
"not all common law rules and practices were suited for the
colonies." 50
Following the Revolution,judges adopted a pragmatic view of the
law, overturning law "they saw as impractical, illogical, or unjust."5 1
Early legal scholars, such as Kent and Blackstone, viewed precedent as
important, but neither saw it is a matter of responsibility or an obliga-
45 Anastasoff 223 F.3d at 905.
46 Anastasoff v. United States, 235 F.3d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
47 Id.
48 Healy, supra note 43, at 55-56. For his eritire discussion of the English com-
mon law tradition, see id. at 56-73.
49 Id. at 73.
50 Id. at 75.
51 Id. at 78.
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tion of judicial power.52 The Supreme Court took an even more lax
approach to issuing opinions than most state courts when it was
founded, indicating the original Court did not evince Judge Arnold's
strict understanding of stare decisis. The Court did not have any rules
regarding the reporting of its opinions, and in fact, issued most of
them orally.53 The Court did not begin officially filing written opin-
ions until the 1830s. 54
Moreover, early Supreme Court opinions did not show much re-
spect for precedent. "Many early justices wrote page after page with-
out citing authority."5 5 Probably the most famous of the early Court
members, Chief Justice Marshall, displayed "a marked disdain for reli-
ance on precedent. ' 56 This demonstrates, at least, the early Court and
its members did not see precedent as important as Judge Arnold
imagines, and they certainly did not understand stare decisis as a con-
stitutional mandate.
Thus, it seems from the history of the common law and the early
Supreme Court, precedent did not have the effect Judge Arnold
imagines it has under the Constitution. The historical evidence, cou-
pled with a lack of textual support and a dearth of evidence in the
opinions of the Court, undercuts Judge Arnold's argument such that I
feel it is of no further consequence to this Note. 57
The theory of principled pragmatic constitutional stare decisis is
deceptively simple. Judges should not be constrained by past constitu-
tional precedent. If a judge agrees with a previous case's interpreta-
tion of the law, the judge should simply state the present case is
controlled by the prior precedent and reaffirm. If the judge dis-
agrees, she does not need to craft a compelling reason other than that
the previous opinion is incorrect.
Having sketched out the basic thesis of principled pragmatic stare
decisis (constitutional precedent is only useful as a tool of judicial
economy and should only be used when the author of the current
opinion agrees with the holding and reasoning of the prior case) and
dispensed with a preliminary constitutional objection, I will now pre-
sent two brief sample opinions demonstrating what principled prag-
52 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 474-80 (John M. Gould ed.,
14th ed. Cambridge Univ. Press 1896) (1826).
53 WILLIAM DOMNARSKI, IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT 7 (1996).
54 Id. at 8-9.
55 Healy, supra note 43, at 85.
56 David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal
Courts, 1801-1835, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 646, 661 (1982).
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matic stare decisis would look like in maintaining and then
overturning prior precedent. Each of these opinions deals with the
Second Amendment right to bear arms and the holding in United
States v. Miller58 that possession of a particular weapon must have
"some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a
well regulated militia."59 I have selected this issue because it is rarely
litigated and fairly simple. Thus, I can write a relatively short opinion
that still demonstrates principled pragmatic stare decisis. For the pur-
pose of these opinions, assume the Second Amendment has been in-
corporated against the states.
A. An Opinion Upholding Prior Precedent
This case deals with a state law banning the use of shotguns with
barrels of less than eighteen inches. Petitioner raised the issue of
whether her right to own such a gun is protected as a right to bear
arms under the Second Amendment.60 Properly respecting vertical
stare decisis, the federal court of appeals held the Second Amend-
ment did not protect her right as we held in United States v. Miller.
61
In Miller we held a federal law outlawing the transport of a shot-
gun with a barrel less than eighteen inches in interstate commerce did
not violate the Second Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion.62 Today, we maintain the holding of that case as the correct
reading of the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Though this case involves a state law, rather than the federal power
under the Commerce Clause, the analysis is substantially similar.
Justice McReynolds wrote the Miller opinion. Justice McReynolds
looked at the history surrounding the creation of the Second Amend-
ment, noting the Constitution originally gave Congress the power to
call forth the militia, and the Second Amendment was created to
maintain such a fighting force. 63 Justice McReynolds further noted
the weapon in question was not "any part of the ordinary military
equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense."
64
Based on Justice McReynolds's compelling reading of the history
and text of the Second Amendment we maintain the Court's holding
today. It is the proper interpretation of the Second Amendment and
58 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
59 Id. at 178.
60 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
61 307 U.S. 174.
62 Id. at 178, 183.
63 Id. at 178.
64 Id.
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the facts before us today are not substantially different from those
before the Court in 1939.
B. An Opinion Setting Aside Prior Precedent
Today, the Court reverses the Second Amendment jurisprudence
set forth in United States v. Miller. Justice McReynolds's reading of the
Second Amendment is not supported by the history he cites or by the
text of the Second Amendment.
Anytime we interpret the Constitution we should start with its
text. The Second Amendment reads: "A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."65 This is one of the few
amendments that contains its own justification and we agree the
Amendment should be read with that justification in mind. However,
we think the Court made a mistake in holding the firearm must bear a
reasonable relation to the maintenance of a militia. Today, we over-
turn Miller and hold the Second Amendment protects all firearms
from government regulation.
Justice McReynolds reads the history of the Second Amendment
he cites incorrectly. He notes at the time of the Constitutional Con-
vention, in all the colonies and in England there was an obligation
that all adult males possess weapons and work for the defense of the
town or colony. 66 Moreover, the General Court of Massachusetts in
1784 required all men between sixteen and forty equip themselves
"and be constantly provided with a fire arm."67
This reading of history makes clear the breadth of the Second
Amendment. Though this Court does not feel constrained by the
strict original understanding of the Constitution, we are not blind to
history. The Miller opinion misreads the text and history of our Con-
stitution. Thus, we overturn it today and affirm the right of all Ameri-
cans to keep and bear arms.
C. A Return to Theory
I hope these small sample opinions make the concept of princi-
pled pragmatic stare decisis clear. Of course, judicial opinions should
be more detailed and probably draw on more outside sources than I
have. However, these opinions still demonstrate the working basics of
principled pragmatic stare decisis. In the first, we see precedent up-
65 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
66 Miller, 307 U.S. at 179-80.
67 Id. at 180.
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held because it is correct and stare decisis saving the judge the trouble
of writing an entirely new opinion. In the second, we see precedent
overruled without special justification; just an explanation the prior
opinion was wrong. Neither opinion hinges on the result. The discus-
sion is about the Constitution and what it means. Before moving on
to address the policy arguments on this issue, I think it would be valua-
ble to list the tenets of my theory.
1. Principled pragmatic stare decisis recognizes horizontal consti-
tutional stare decisis is only a tool for judicial economy.
2. Principled pragmatic stare decisis respects the decisions of the
past in terms of their reasoning and understanding of history as long
as the reasoning and understanding is correct.
3. Principled pragmatic stare decisis demands opinion authors
write for the future when they set out precedent because opinions will
not stand the test of time without being properly reasoned.
4. Principled pragmatic stare decisis demands authors respect
past opinions and explain fully why these opinions are wrong when
the authors overturn past precedent.
III. POLICY CONCERNS OF PRINCIPLED PRAGMATIC STARE DECISIS
As we have seen in Parts I and II of this Note, the Constitution
does not require stare decisis; it is a policy choice. Thus, my final task
is to demonstrate principled pragmatic stare decisis is a good policy
choice. First, I detail the disadvantages of the current state of stare
decisis and demonstrate how principled pragmatic stare decisis over-
comes each. Next, I explain three policy arguments supporting the
current state of stare decisis and show how pragmatic stare decisis
meets each. Finally, I highlight some new policy advantages of princi-
pled pragmatic stare decisis.
The disadvantages of a strict model of stare decisis are as follows:
(1) applying stare decisis in wrong cases only perpetuates illegitimate
and unconstitutional holdings, (2) strict stare decisis cannot accom-
modate changing social and political understandings, (3) stare decisis
leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands
of Congress, and (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future
courts while those judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing
with them.68
Principled pragmatic stare decisis avoids all of these pitfalls. By
keeping courts free to overturn precedent we can be sure illegitimate
and unconstitutional decisions are overturned because they will not
68 Consovoy, supra note 1, at 54-55.
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be maintained out of some misplaced reverence for the history of the
Court. Courts will be able to adapt to changing social and political
understandings in a responsible way. Under principled pragmatic
stare decisis, courts are still obligated to explain why they are depart-
ing from prior precedent and why their precedent should be followed
in the future, providing a measure of protection against courts follow-
ing a social or political fad rather than a principle that stands the test
of time.
Principled pragmatic stare decisis also allows the Court and Con-
gress to be partners in overturning bad law. Congress and the Presi-
dent maintain the traditional checks on the federal courts including
appointment, 69 jurisdiction control,70 and lawmaking power,71 while
the Court is able to protect the interests of the minority through itsjudicial power. While Congress may not be able to muster the politi-
cal capital to overturn an unconstitutional law, the Court will be free
to do so without having to overcome the vague stare decisis power of
past precedent. Finally, principled pragmatic stare decisis should give
comfort to those who decry activist judges and their power to illegiti-
mately change the Constitution for years to come. Under my theory,judges will be able to overturn precedent that is wrong and will be
unshackled from the poor decisions of the past to generate sound,
correct decisions that will stand the test of time.
This argument prompts a possible problem with the theory.
What should a judge do if she agrees with a particular holding as a
matter of law but does not agree with the reasoning supporting the
holding? Applying the thesis of principled pragmatic stare decisis thejudge should not overturn the case and thus maintain the holding.
However, the judge must do the extra work and explain the new rea-
soning behind the decision so a future Court can look to the new
reasoning as an update and make a more informed judgment about
the future of the law as laid down in prior cases.
Moving to the advantages of stare decisis, three common argu-
ments on behalf of stare decisis are: (1) it legitimizes judicial institu-
tions (2) it "promotes judicial economy," and (3) it "allows for
predictability." 72 Constitutional stare decisis advocates claim that "by
adhering to precedent, in all but the rarest of circumstances, courts
not only show deference to their predecessors but also give weight to
current decisions because the citizenry recognizes the lasting impact
69 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
70 Id. art. III, § 2.
71 Id. art. I.
72 Consovoy, supra note 1, at 54.
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these decisions will have."' 73 I would like to analyze this claim by de-
bunking its "deference" and "lasting impact" segments separately.
The notion of showing deference to past courts only has power if
that deference promotes a positive reaction to the judiciary among
the body politic. If deference demonstrates a lack of careful consider-
ation and causes people to question the court's legitimacy as an insti-
tution, then it is not particularly valuable. It seems that in particularly
controversial cases, a court would have a tough time showing defer-
ence to its predecessors solely as a matter of law. Rather, a court
would have tojustify its decision either to stick with precedent or over-
rule it. Imagine, in the near future, the Supreme Court's membership
is made up of at least five members who believe Roe v. Wade74 is an
incorrect interpretation of the Constitution and the states are free to
regulate and criminalize abortion as they wish. If a case came before
the Court and it upheld Roe, pro-life activists would be upset, particu-
larly if the Court chooses to uphold Roe solely as a matter of stare
decisis. Conversely, pro-choice activists would be upset if the Court
summarily announced it was overturning Roe without any mention of
the merits of the original opinion. Principled pragmatic stare decisis
demands the Court do neither. Rather, the Court must show respect
to the original opinion. The Court would be obligated to explain why
the original opinion was wrong, or given the controversy, why it was a
correct interpretation of the Constitution. Principled pragmatic stare
decisis demands a high level of skill from opinion writers. By explain-
ing reasoning, rather than appealing to stare decisis, the Court re-
spects the opinions of the past while giving respect properly due to
the citizens of the present. At least, in the example above, if the Court
wrote a careful constitutionally based opinion, advocates on both sides
could attempt to understand the legal reasoning, rather than blam-
ing/lauding the opinion based on political results. Thus, the defer-
ence shown to the Court is genuine and earned through careful
reasoning and opinion writing.
The second prong of this justification for traditional stare decisis
is that decisions will have lasting impact because citizens will know
they are going to be followed in the future. This increases the legiti-
macy of the Court as a body of judgment rather than a series of indi-
viduals imposing their collective political will on the population. First,
as I have discussed above, principled pragmatic opinions will have a
lasting impact because they will be carefully reasoned and explain to
future courts why they are correct interpretations of the Constitution.
73 Id.
74 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
19232005]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Moreover, it seems unlikely principled pragmatic stare decisis would
change how citizens follow the law very much. Presently, the Court
follows the opinions of the past most of the time, and I think underly-
ing those opinions is the notion those decisions were correct. Princi-
pled pragmatic stare decisis would just force the Court to own up to
the belief past decisions are correct rather than just correct as a mat-
ter of their age. Furthermore, citizens will give greater weight to opin-
ions because they will see how carefully cases are decided to stand the
test of time, rather than appearing to be arbitrary and just an exercise
of the Court's power to cast down decisions for the future.
The second argument for stare decisis is it supports judicial econ-
omy. Principled pragmatic stare decisis requires that stare decisis be
only a tool for judicial economy, so it appears to meet this policy
choice. However, because judicial economy is designed "to reduce
caseloads and create[ ] disincentives to relitigation of precedent
cases," 75 one might argue principled pragamtic stare decisis would en-
courage relitigation because one would never know when a court
might overturn a case. I think this is disingenuous. Skilled attorneys
presently know when a court is likely to overturn a case based on the
court's composition, the social climate, and the age of the precedent.
In fact, the Supreme Court has noted these factors as possible reasons
for overturning prior precedent. 76 Moreover, my theory allows courts
to reduce caseloads by simply noting it agrees with the previous hold-
ing and the reasoning that supported it.
Finally, I would like to note principled pragmatic stare decisis
supports authentic judicial economy. We should not endorse judicial
economy for the sake of judicial economy. Our goal should be to
reduce caseloads in a way that encourages alternative dispute resolu-
tion or eliminates claims without merit. We should not discourage
litigants from challenging the current interpretation of the Constitu-
tion. The separate but equal doctrine was only changed through a
clever and complex litigation strategy. Principled pragmatic stare de-
cisis encourages such litigation because litigants know they will get a
fair shake from the Court, while strict stare decisis discourages such
innovation. Judicial economy for the sake of judicial economy is not
fair to litigants and does not comport with traditional notions of jus-
tice. Principled pragmatic stare decisis ensures manageable dockets,
encourages innovation, and never compromises justice for the sake of
time.
75 Consovoy, supra note 1, at 54.
76 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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The third justification for traditional stare decisis is that it allows
for predictability because "individuals are able to conform their be-
havior to a certain set of guidelines, and in return they are rewarded
with the knowledge that this behavior, in line with the judicial deter-
mination, will be protected under law."'77 I think this justification ap-
plies more to statutory interpretation questions that I do not deal with
in this Note. People traditionally conform their behavior to guide-
lines in the law and judicial interpretation of the law. However, even
as this justification applies to constitutional interpretation I do not
think it is a problem for principled pragmatic stare decisis. As I have
discussed above, there are factors a potential litigant could look at to
determine whether a change in precedent is likely. Moreover, what if
the behavior an individual expects to be protected does not comport
with a proper interpretation of the Constitution? That individual is
protected while those who believe his behavior is unconstitutional are
disgusted the Court will maintain prior precedent when it is blatantly
wrong.
In addition to meeting the policy advantages of stare decisis and
avoiding its pitfalls, principled pragmatic stare decisis has some advan-
tages of its own. Principally, it encourages careful and skilled opinion
writing. As a preliminary matter, judges do not like to be overturned.
Judges want their opinions to last, especially regarding constitutional
matters. Principled pragmatic stare decisis demands judges write care-
fully, considering all possible arguments that could be raised to their
position. The objections of the dissent remain a specter over the ma-
jority as the case could be overturned at any time. Presently, the ma-
jority can disregard those objections, but under principled pragmatic
stare decisis every effort should be made to answer those and any fu-
ture objections. Judges have to write with respect for the past and
reason for the future courts that may overturn them.
Moreover, judges will have to write to persuade those who have
different philosophies on how the Constitution should be interpreted.
Because future judges will be able to overturn precedent, opinion
writers will want to include persuasive pleas to almost any interpretive
philosophy. Alternatively, judges will have to justify their own inter-
pretive choice as the correct one for all courts. Jane S. Schacter pro-
vides a model for how to have such a debate in the area of statutory
interpretation. 78 Her model "offers litigants a framework for advocat-
ing, and courts and scholars a framework for assessing, interpretive
77 Consovoy, supra note 1, at 54.
78 Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 593 (1995).
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rules in the near term." 79 Professor Schacter's work focuses on the
underlying democratic values behind different interpretive strategies.
A similar debate could be had in the area of constitutional law. Why is
it appropriate the Founders' understanding control law today? What
values are we trying to protect? Does a "living Constitution" prevent
us from reading any lasting values into the structure and text of the
Constitution? I think a debate about the rules of the constitutional
debate is a debate worth having. It would allow "us to move beyond
the deadening discourse of restraint and activism that has long domi-
nated thinking above interpretive legitimacy."8 0 Principled pragmatic
stare decisis provides a real reason to have this new discussion and
works towards resolving a problem we are not even having a debate
about right now.
The final advantage of principled pragmatic stare decisis is that it
increases the legitimacy of the judiciary as part of American democ-
racy. The judicial branch will be forced to write careful and consid-
ered opinions that are subject to the review and scrutiny of not only
higher courts, but future courts as well. Hopefully, these new opin-
ions will help ameliorate some concern that the Court is beholden to
special political interests or is simply bound by the faulty decisions of
the past.
CONCLUSION
Throughout this Note, I have made the case that courts should
adopt principled pragmatic stare decisis as it relates to horizontal,
constitutional review. I have demonstrated the history of the judiciary
does not compel stare decisis, sketched out what principled pragmatic
stare decisis entails, and suggested policy advantages for the proposal.
Before concluding my work with a call for change I would like to an-
swer one key objection.
One might object my proposal is simply unworkable. The judici-
ary has chosen to adopt stare decisis in constitutional cases and as an
entrenched feature of the law it would not be wise to change. I have
two responses to that objection. First, I do not think we should fear
change that would be good for the judiciary, encourage substantive
debate, and increase legitimacy. Any problems associated with change
will be mitigated by the realized policy advantages. Moreover, I do
not think stare decisis is as entrenched in the current Supreme Court
as one may think. Various commentators have suggested the Rehn-
quist Court has functionally abandoned stare decisis in constitutional
79 Id. at 661.
80 Id at 660.
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cases. 81 We have not seen any disastrous consequences so far. All I
am asking courts to do is own up to what they are already doing.
Principled pragmatic stare decisis is workable and it is the best
idea for the future of the judiciary in constitutional interpretation.
Anytime we are presented with an idea that facilitates judicial candor
about the process and appropriate rules for judging we should take
that proposal seriously. " IT] he judiciary is often given an elevated
level of respect and deference .. . [as] a result of the judiciary's ap-
pearance as the most neutral and just branch, detached from politics
and personal interest. '8 2 Strict stare decisis defeats that respect for
the reasons I have already discussed. Unprincipled pragmatic stare
decisis (stick with the results for their own sake) is neither neutral nor
just; it is at best a reflection of the judge's personal political prefer-
ences and at worst the easy way out of any given dispute. Principled
pragmatic stare decisis evinces precisely what we do and should de-
mand from the judiciary: efficient work that never sacrifices intelli-
gent reasoning and just results.
81 See, e.g., Bork et al., supra note 1; Consovoy, supra note 1; Cooper, supra note 2.
82 Consovoy, supra note 1, at 53.
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